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Competition and Deployment of New
Technology in U.S. Telecommunications
Howard A. Shelanskit
Participants in regulatory and antitrust proceedings affect-
ing telecommunications have, with increasing frequency, asserted
that policy decisions designed to promote or preserve competition
will have unintended, negative consequences for technological
change.1 The goal of this study is to determine the initial pre-
sumption with which regulators and enforcement agencies should
approach such contentions. To that end, this Article examines
how the introduction of new technology in U.S. telecommunica-
tions networks has historically related to market structure. It
analyzes deployment data from a sample of technologies and
finds that innovations have been more rapidly deployed in tele-
communications networks the more competitive have been the
markets in which those networks operated. This positive correla-
tion between competition and adoption of new technology sug-
gests that regulators and enforcement officials should be wary of
claims that, by adhering to policies designed to preserve competi-
tion, they will impede firms from deploying innovations or
bringing new services to consumers.2
f School of Law, University of California at Berkeley. In 1999 the author served as
Chief Economist of the Federal Communications Commission. This Article reflects the
views of the author and not necessarily those of the FCC. The author wishes to thank
William Baumol, Stagg Newman, Robert Pepper, and Donald Stockdale for helpful com-
ments. Quindi Franco provided exceptional assistance in the preparation of this study.
I Cellular Telecommunications Industry Association, 13 FCC Rec 25132, 25157
(1998); Comments of GTE, WT Docket No 98-205, 20 (2000); Reply Comments GTE, WT
Docket No 98-205, 16-19 (1999); Comments of Cellular Telecommunications Industry
Association, WT Docket No 98-205, 3 (1999); Comments of Southern Bell Communications
Wireless Corp, WT Docket No 98-205, 4, 11; Comments of Omnipoint Communications,
Inc, WT Docket No 98-205, 4 (1999); Comments of Rural Telecommunications Group, WT
Docket No 98-205, 6 (1999); Comments of Western Wireless Corp, WT Docket No 98-205, 9
(1999).
2 It is important to note that deployment of new technology may bear only an indirect
relationship to development of new technology. This study's results, and the policy rec-
ommendation they yield, thus apply more to the relationship between market structure
and commercial implementation of new technology than they do the relationship between
market structure and the process of innovation itself. The term "innovation" in this article
thus refers to deployment, rather than creation, of new network technology.
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The burden should rest with parties whose actions would
concentrate markets to demonstrate offsetting benefits from in-
novation. There will certainly be instances when good evidence
supports the likelihood of a tradeoff between competition today
and new technology tomorrow. For example, financial and techni-
cal analysis might demonstrate that deployment of an innovative
facility or service is truly contingent on achieving larger scale or
unifying complementary assets. Or, data might show that con-
sumers are beginning to consider new services as substitutes for
established ones and that markets should be defined more flexi-
bly and dynamically. When there is good reason to believe that
tradeoffs between competition and technological change both ex-
ist and will produce net economic benefits, regulators should not
be so focused on short-term market structure and performance
that they miss greater dynamic benefits. Any presumption in fa-
vor of preserving existing competition must therefore be subject
to rebuttal.
The difficulty in establishing a sturdy presumption about the
interaction between market structure and innovation stems from
the complexity of the underlying relationship. Changes in market
structure do not completely, or perhaps even significantly, ex-
plain variation in rates of technological deployment. Market
structure might correlate with other variables that simultane-
ously affect innovation. For example, in a regulated industry like
telecommunications, it is particularly likely that pricing rules,
service requirements, subsidy flows and other regulatory and in-
stitutional factors affect technological decisions. Because those
variables are not incorporated into this study's analysis, neither
the comparative importance nor causal significance of market
structure for innovation can be determined here. This Article's
results therefore cannot on their own be interpreted to support
stricter antitrust enforcement or more aggressive market-entry
regulation in the name of innovation. The historical correlation
between market structure and innovation does, however, allow
policy makers to discern whether competition and technological
progress have consistently converged or diverged and, on that
basis, to adopt guiding presumptions and assign burdens of per-
suasion when parties to a proceeding contend that those objec-
tives will conflict.
Part I of this Article discusses the emergence of innovation as
a central concern in telecommunications regulation and describes
how, in several important proceedings, parties have portrayed
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innovation and competition as being in conflict. Part II briefly
examines the theoretical and empirical economic literature on the
relationship between market structure and technological change.
That discussion shows the difficulty of creating strong, broadly
applicable presumptions about how policies affecting competition
will in turn affect innovation. Part III then looks at the telecom-
munications sector to see how, at a very general level, market
structure has related to the deployment of new technology. Ex-
amining a sample of ten significant telecommunications tech-
nologies, Part III describes the structures of the markets in which
manufacturers and telecom service providers developed and de-
ployed those technologies, and then identifies the rate at which
each innovation was adopted. Part IV concludes, based on the
historical data, that regulators should adopt a rebuttable pre-
sumption against claims that competition will conflict with tech-
nological advancement in the telecommunications industry.
I. INNOVATION AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS REGULATION
Policy makers have long understood that technological prog-
ress is essential for long-term economic expansion. Recently,
however, trends in biotechnology, telecommunications, comput-
ers, and the complex of enterprises surrounding the internet have
made the dividends of technology front-page news. "High-tech"
industries-aerospace, telecommunications, biotechnology, and
computers-have increased their aggregate share of U.S. manu-
facturing output more than 50 percent since 1980.' And the num-
ber of patents granted annually in the United States, which first
surpassed 100,000 in 1994, reached almost 170,000 in 1999.
4
Technology's perceived role in the recent, long cycle of growth
in the U.S. economy has caused policy makers and consumers
alike to pay greater attention to how innovation can increase eco-
nomic welfare. One manifestation of this attention to innovation
is heightened sensitivity to whether the goals or presumptions of
existing public policies might conflict with the goal of technologi-
cal progress.' Whether regulators must sometimes make tradeoffs
between innovation tomorrow and efficient resource allocation
3 Economic Report of the President: Transmitted to the Congress February 1999 171
(GPO 1999).
4 Id at 172; U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, 1999 Patent Statistics Announced,
Press Release #00-16 (Mar 2, 2000), available online at <http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/
comlspeeches/00-16.htm> (visited May 30, 2000).
5 Economic Report of the President at 173-93 (cited in note 3).
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today has been debated in such diverse contexts as, for example,
environmental regulation and antitrust policy.'
The question of how policy affects technological innovation
has become particularly salient in the telecommunications sector.
In the last 20 years this industry has embraced fiber optics, cre-
ated mass-market wireless services, and deployed the essential
infrastructure for the internet, to name just a few developments.
Indeed, the telecommunications industry has been responsible for
a growing share of patents issued in the United States (see Fig-
ure 1). For the most part, however, fostering new technology was
an implicit objective in telecommunications policies that were
more expressly concerned with competition and market structure.
The emergence of innovation as a principal objective of its own in
regulatory debates and antitrust enforcement decisions is a quite
recent development.
Figure 1: Telecommunications Patents as
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Several kinds of policy arguments hinge on innovation. The
most common form of the argument, made by participants in re-
cent proceedings at the Federal Communications Commission
("FCC," "Commission") and the Department of Justice, is that
6 See, for example, id at 188-211.
7 US Patent and Trademark Office (August 1999) Patent Counts by Class by Year,
Jan 1977-June 1999.
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innovation may suffer if regulators focus too narrowly on pre-
serving or improving competition in existing markets. For exam-
ple, FCC regulations bar a single wireless carrier from holding
licenses to use more than 45 MHz of the 180 MHz of cellular and
PCS spectrum available in a given geographical market.' This
"spectrum cap" ensures that each geographical market can have
at least four competitors providing mobile phone service. In the
FCC's 1999 proceedings on whether to retain the 45 MHz cap',
several carriers argued that consolidation of competing licenses is
a necessary condition for the development of innovative wireless
data services (so-called "third generation" services).1" Those carri-
ers argued that without such consolidation, they would be uncer-
tain of having sufficient spectrum capacity for the new services
and hence would find it too risky to invest in developing the new
technology. In the FCC's recent rulemaking limiting the number
of subscribers a single cable company can serve, some cable op-
erators similarly argued that the introduction of broadband and
telephone services on cable networks requires large-scale sys-
tems.11
A related argument is that regulators will harm innovation if
they adhere to obsolescent market definitions. MCI and Sprint
contended that new technology like the internet protocol is fast
making the separate market of "long-distance" telephony a
meaningless concept. They argued that blocking a merger based
on a soon-to-be-outmoded definition of the relevant market would
impede beneficial combinations. MCI and Sprint further argued
that even if their merger would have made a meaningfully de-
fined long-distance market more concentrated, such concentra-
tion would have enabled the companies to make other markets-
like that for local phone service-more competitive through de-
ployment of new wireless technology and other advancements. 2
8 47 CFR § 20.6 (2000).
9 See Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, FCC 98-308; Comments of Cellular Telecom-
munications Industry Association, WT Docket 98-205; Report and Order, 47 CFR Parts 20
and 22.
10 Cellular Telecommunications Industry Association, 13 FCC Rec at 25157; Com-
ments of GTE, WT Docket No 98-205 at 20; Reply Comments GTE, WT Docket No 98-205
at 16-19; Comments of Cellular Telecommunications Industry Association, WT Docket No
98-205 at 3; Comments of Southern Bell Communications Wireless Corp, WT Docket No
98-205 at 4, 11; Comments of Omnipoint Communications, Inc, WT Docket No 98-205 at 4;
Comments of Rural Telecommunications Group, WT Docket No 98-205 at 6; Comments of
Western Wireless Corp, WT Docket No 98-205 at 9.
11 In the Matter of Implementation of the Cable Television Consumer Protection and
Competition Act of 1992, CS Docket No 98-82, 26 (1999).
12 See MCI WorldCom and Sprint, CC Docket No 99-333, 76 (1999).
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The merging parties are thus also asking the Commission and
the Department of Justice to trade concentration in one market
for competition in another.
The Federal Communications Commission has addressed the
above challenges in a case-by-case manner and has generally
maintained its emphasis on competition and static efficiency. In
the spectrum cap proceeding, the Commission retained the 45
MHz limit in the interests of preserving current competition. 3
But it also pledged to revisit the cap in two years. 4 And, in the
meantime, it invited waiver requests from carriers that can show
they are moving forward with new services that require addi-
tional spectrum. In the cable ownership proceedings,'15 the Com-
mission imposed a subscriber limit, as Congress by statute re-
quired it to do. But the FCC also said it would not attribute to an
operator's subscriber count any customers to whom it provided
only telephone or broadband, but not conventional cable video,
services.
The effort in both of the cases above was to preserve competi-
tion without blunting incentives to invest in the development and
deployment of new technology. But the above examples also show
that in telecommunications policy, innovation and its potential
tradeoffs will be a recurring issue to which a more informed ap-
proach will be necessary. If regulators or enforcement officials
focus too rigidly on competition and the immediate benefits of
lower prices and higher output, they might in some cases place at
risk longer-term benefits of innovation. If, on the other hand,
they too readily exchange actual competition for promised inno-
vation, they risk creating market power without deriving any
compensating benefit.
Striking the right policy balance is especially challenging
where, as in telecommunications, the pace of innovation makes
predictions of technological change unusually plausible. Immi-
nent technological developments will transform some markets in
ways that make current market definitions obsolete. And some
innovations would occur more rapidly if carriers merged comple-
mentary assets. But, although maintaining or increasing compe-
tition in existing markets might have costs for innovation in spe-
13 See Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, FCC 98-308; Comments of Cellular Telecom-
munications Industry Association, WT Docket 98-205; Report and Order, 47 CFR § 20, 22
(2000).
14 Id.
15 In the Matter of Implementation of Section 11(c) of the Cable Television Consumer
Protection and Competition Act of 1992, 14 FCC Rec 19098 (1999).
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cific cases, it is far less clear that such costs will often be at stake,
even in the dynamic environment of U.S. telecommunications.
Policy makers concerned with telecommunications would thus
benefit from a framework through which to distinguish cases
where emphasis on current market structure may have net, long-
term costs from cases where it will not. The first step in develop-
ing that framework is to determine what the starting presump-
tion of the analysis should be and, correspondingly, where the
initial burden of persuasion should rest. The next section surveys
existing research on the economics of innovation and examines
the guidance it offers for answering the above questions.
II. THE ECONOMICS OF MARKET STRUCTURE AND INNOVATION
Joseph A. Schumpeter wrote in 1942 that, for purposes of
economic welfare, "perfect competition is not only impossible but
inferior, and has no title to being set up as a model of ideal effi-
ciency."16 Since that time, scholars have investigated whether,
and under what conditions, innovation and allocative efficiency
might respond differently to changes in market structure.
Schumpeter's argument-that most technological innovation
would come from large corporations with market power and or-
ganized R&D operations-implied that public policies focusing on
current (or "static") competition could have substantial social
costs over time.'7 He suggested that the economic conditions that
maximize innovation in the long run might not be the same con-
ditions that allocate resources efficiently in the short run.
Schumpeter's conjecture sparked research by economists who
sought to identify the market and firm structures most conducive
to the production and adoption of new products and processes."
The sections that follow briefly survey two areas of that research:
studies relating innovation to firm size, and studies relating in-
novation to market structure. In each case the research reveals
16 Joseph A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy at 106 (Harper &
Row 3d ed 1942).
17 Of course, antitrust's competitive ideal has evolved over time. When Schumpeter
was writing, the ideal was rivalry among small, atomized economic actors. Any coopera-
tion or concentration that deviated from that standard was inherently suspect. The Chi-
cago School revolution greatly improved understanding of why different market structures
might arise in various contexts and reduce rigid adherence to the perfectly competitive
model. Competition, because of its benefits for allocative efficiency, nonetheless remained
the touchstone of antitrust policy.
18 For a survey of this literature, see Morton I. Kamien and Nancy L. Schwartz, Mar-
ket Structure and Innovation (Cambridge 1982); William L. Baldwin and John T. Scott,
Market Structure and Technological Change (Harwood Academic 1987).
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some areas of consensus, but more clearly demonstrates ambigui-
ties that make it difficult to craft general presumptions about
how firm or market structures affect technological change.
A. Firm Size and Innovation
In several recent proceedings at the FCC, parties have
claimed they need to increase the size of their operations in order
to deploy advanced technology and provide new services. For ex-
ample, in the Commission's cable ownership and attribution pro-
ceedings, AT&T pledged that expanding the reach of its systems
would enable the company to speed the upgrade of its network to
provide telephone and high-speed data services.19 SBC and
Ameritech similarly argued in their 1999 merger proceedings
that the combination of the firms would speed the deployment of
broadband telephony to residential customers.2 °
There has been substantial debate over the relevance of firm
size to innovation. Following Schumpeter, some economists have
praised large enterprises for their superior ability to attract the
financial and human capital, bear the risk, and recoup the in-
vestment required for sustained R&D activities.2 However, other
economists have touted small firms as being more creative and
more nimble in adapting to changes and opportunities than their
larger, more bureaucratic counterparts.22
Many empirical studies have addressed the relationship be-
tween firm size and innovation. Numerous early studies found
that investment in R&D increased steadily with firm size.23
Whether comparing evidence across industries or within a par-
19 In the Matter of Implementation of the Cable Television Consumer Protection and
Competition Act of 1992, 14 FCC Rec 19014, 19026 (1999).
20 In the Matter of Ameritech Corporation, 2000 FCC Lexis 4765, *3.
21 See generally John Kenneth Galbraith, American Capitalism: The Concept of Coun-
tervailing Power at 86-88, (Houghton Mifflin Rev ed 1952); William D. Nordhaus, Inven-
tion, Growth, and Welfare: A Theoretical Treatment of Technological Change (MIT 1969).
22 Kamien and Schwartz, Market Structure and Innovation at 33 (cited in note 18);
Wesley M. Cohen and Richard C. Levin, Empirical Studies of Innovation and Market
Structure, in Richard Schmalensee and Robert D. Willing, eds, 2 Handbook of Industrial
Organization 1067 (North-Holland 1989).
23 See, for example, Ira Horowitz, Firm Size and Research Activity, 28 S Econ J 298
(1962) (finding some basis for the belief that bigness favors research); William S. Coma-
nor, Market Structure, Product Differentiation, and Industrial Research, 81 Quarterly J
Econ 639, 657 (1967) (concluding that while smaller firms often spend as much on re-
search as larger rivals, higher concentration can lead to increased research spending in
some situations).
24 See, for example, P.D. Loeb, Further Evidence of the Determinants of Industrial
Research and Development Using Single and Simultaneous Equation Models, 8 Empirical
Econ 203 (1983) (comparing 303 firms across almost all industrial categories for the year
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ticular industry,25 studies generally showed that R&D was higher
in larger enterprises." Other studies, however, found that very
small firms were in fact more innovation-intensive than middle-
sized firms."
More recent research yields a consensus that, in general,
R&D rises only proportionately with firm size, and only up to a
point.2" Moreover, this pattern varies across industries. In the
chemical industry, for example, studies have found R&D to in-
crease significantly with firm size, while in other industries such
as petroleum, drugs, steel and glass, researchers have found the
reverse to be true. But on the whole, economists find that the
data best supports proportional increases.0 Therefore, while a
large enterprise might invest more in R&D than a small one, it
does not invest more than an equal-sized aggregation of small
firms.
Available data and research thus call into question the conjec-
ture that large firms are superior innovators, although studies do
not support the contrary view that large firms are bad for tech-
nological progress and economic growth. The evidence overall
suggests that, to the extent firm size has an effect on innovation,
its magnitude and direction depend on associated industry-level
variables and are susceptible to very few general presumptions.
The results suggest that especially large firms will have no spe-
cial tendency-nor any predictable reluctance--to engage in in-
1971); John B. Meisel and Steven A.Y. Lin, The Impact of Market Structure on the Firm's
Allocation of Resources to Research and Development, 23 Quarterly Rev Econ & Bus 28
(1983) (using data on 1,026 businesses in the year 1974).
25 See Edwin Mansfield, Industrial Research and Development Expenditures: Deter-
minants, Prospects, and Relation to Size of Firm and Inventive Output, 72 J Pol Econ 319
(1964) (evaluating research and development in chemical, petroleum, drug, steel, and
glass industries); Henry G. Grabowski, The Determinants of Industrial Research and
Development: A Study of the Chemical, Drug, and Petroleum Industries, 76 J Pol Econ 292
(1968) (investigating research expenditures in the chemical, drug, and petroleum refining
industries).
28 Cohen and Levin, Empirical Studies at 1068 (cited in note 22).
27 See, for example, John Bound et al, Who Does R&D and Who Patents? 1, 21 in Zvi
Griliches, ed, R&D, Patents, and Productivity (Chicago 1984).
28 See, for example, F.M. Scherer, Firm Size, Market Structure, Opportunity, and the
Output of Patented Inventions, 55 American Econ Rev 1097 (1965) (concluding that incen-
tive output increases with first sales, but at less then proportional rates, and raising
doubts about whether large firm are as efficient as previously thought).
29 Edwin Mansfield, Industrial Research and Technological Innovation, 43 (Norton
1968) ("[E]xcept for the chemical industry, there is no evidence that the largest firms [in
petroleum, drugs, steel and glass] spent more on research and development than did
somewhat smaller firms.").
30 Scherer, Firm Size, Market Structure (cited in note 28); see generally Wesley M.
Cohen and Steven Klepper, A Reprise of Size and R&D, 106 Econ J 925 (1996).
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novation, and that small, fringe firms may play important roles
over time in technologically advancing markets."1
B. Competition and Technological Change
While Schumpeter raised interesting questions about firm
scale and innovation, the more troublesome implications for pub-
lic policy came from his conjecture about the relationship between
market structure and technological innovation. Antitrust policy
was then, as it is today, grounded in the virtues of economic com-
petition. The idea that competition could impede innovation and
reduce long-term economic benefits posed a challenge to the anti-
trust paradigm.
Like antitrust policy generally, regulatory policy in communi-
cations has presumed that market competition benefits economic
welfare. For example, in its review of firms' decisions to enter and
exit regulated telecommunications markets, the FCC presumes
that entry by new competitors benefits the public interest." As a
general matter, in conducting its public interest review, the
Commission "refrain[s] from requiring new entrants to demon-
strate beneficial effects of competition"3 and presumes that "ef-
fective competition directly advances the public interest."34 The
FCC might not favor competitive entry when there is "a showing
that competition will produce detrimental effects." 5 And the
Commission fully recognizes that not only competition, but also
"provision of new technologies and services to the public" serves
the public interest. But the stated emphasis in the FCC's public
interest determinations, at least in the common-carrier context,
has been on competition.
The presumption that increased benefits come from increased
competition may be open to question, however, when the policy
goal is not just lower prices for a given set of goods produced un-
der a fixed set of technologies, but also efficient innovative activ-
ity by firms over time. Theoretical research has shown that, de-
31 See, for example, Jon Baker, Fringe Firms and Incentives to Innovate, 63 Antitrust
L J 621 (1995).
32 See, for example, In the Matter of Time Warner Entertainment Co and US West
Communications, Inc., 8 FCC Rec 7106, 7107-08 (1993); MTS-WATS Market Structure
Inquiry, 92 FCC 2d 787, 790-91 (1982).
33 MTS and WATS Market Structure, 81 FCC 2d 177, 201 (1980).
34 Market Entry and Regulation of Foreign-Affiliated Entities, 11 FCC Rec 3873, 3878
(1995).
35 MTS and WATS, 81 FCC 2d at 201.
36 Time Warner, 8 FCC Rec at 7107.
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pending on various conditions, either monopoly power or competi-
tion may increase total innovation.
We can return to Schumpeter's work for arguments support-
ing firms with market power. Although Schumpeter wrote mostly
about large firms and their associated economies of scale for
R&D, and their ability to attract capital and talented scientists,
his critique of perfect competition and discussion of the benefits
of market power suggest that his superior innovators were not
only large, but dominant as well.37 Early theoretical explorations
of Schumpeter's claim found that increased competition stimu-
lates greater innovative effort among rivals up to a point, but
that innovation actually diminishes once the amount of competi-
tion surpasses a certain threshold. Thus, in this model, innova-
tion is weak where there is either no competition or vigorous
competition.
Although there have been many advances and refinements in
the model described above," the intuition underlying the rela-
tionship it shows between market structure and innovation is
straightforward. A firm that is engaged in rivalry over market
share has incentives to develop new products and processes that
will help it to improve or defend its market position. However, a
competitive firm also faces higher risk and tighter financial con-
straints than does a firm with market power. Even if intellectual
property rights give the innovator a temporary monopoly, rivals
may develop similar or better advances. The risk that another
firm will successfully innovate grows with competition and, at
some point, the expected return on innovation may not justify the
cost.
A monopolist or firm with market power, by contrast, proba-
bly has more resources for R&D and a better chance of recouping
R&D investment. Large, established firms might be particularly
adept at incremental innovation or at commercialization of small
firms' inventions. And even a monopolist-especially an unregu-
lated one-has some incentive to engage in cost-reducing innova-
tions. But because a monopolist already has the market share for
which competitive firms strive, it might have less incentive to
pursue product innovations and improvements than might firms
facing competition. Further, a monopolist might have an incen-
37 Schumpeter, Captialism, Socialism, and Democracy at 106 (cited in note 16).
38 See, for example, Jennifer F. Reinganum, The Timing of Innovation: Research,
Development and Diffusion, in Richard Schmalensee and Robert D. Willing, eds, 1 Hand-
book of Industrial Organization (North Holland 1989).
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tive to innovate strategically to protect its profits and market
power rather than to benefit consumers.
Unfortunately, empirical data do not resolve the ambiguous
theoretical relationship between competition and innovation.
Many analyses supported the Schumpeterian view by finding a
positive correlation between market concentration and R&D in-
vestment.39 Others concluded that concentration has a negative
effect on innovation.4" A study by F.M. Scherer found that the
relationship between market structure and innovation follows an
"inverted-U" pattern: innovation is low at high levels of competi-
tion, reaches its peak at intermediate levels of oligopoly (e.g.
where the four leading firms control roughly half the market),
and then falls off as market structure approaches monopoly.41
Several studies reproduced and confirmed Scherer's results,42
while others added complexity to the findings. When researchers
controlled for industry-level factors like appropriability condi-
tions and "technological opportunity,"43 the overall effect of con-
centration was ambiguous in the range of market structures
studied." Several other studies question more generally whether
there is an optimal market structure for promoting innovation,
but they agree with the studies showing a non-linear, inverted-U
relationship in that they find little evidence that high levels of
either competition or concentration are particularly conducive to
innovation."
39 See, for example, Mansfield, 72 J Pol Econ 319 (cited in note 25); Horowitz, 29 S
Econ J 298 (cited in note 23).
40 See, for example, Arun K. Mukhopadhyay, Technological Progress and Change in
Market Concentration in the U.S., 1963-77, 52 S Econ J 141 (1985); Barry Bozeman and
Albert N. Link, Investments in Technology: Corporate Strategy and Public Policy Alterna-
tives (Praeger 1983); Oliver E. Williamson, Innovation and Market Structure, 73 J Pol
Econ 67 (1965).
41 See F.M. Scherer, Market Structure and the Employment of Scientists and Engi-
neers, 57 American Econ Rev 524 (1967).
42 See, for example, Wesley M. Cohen, Richard C. Levin, and David C. Mowery, R&D
Appropriability, Opportunity, and Market Structure: New Evidence on Some Schumpete-
rian Hypotheses, 75 American Econ Rev Papers and Proceedings 20 (1985).
43 "Technological opportunity" is a murky concept that includes the range and matur-
ity of technologies used in an industry as well as industry factors affecting the prospects
for earning a return on further innovations.
44 See Wesley M. Cohen & Richard C. Levin, Handbook of Industrial Organization at
1074-77 (cited in note 22).
45 Id.
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C. Lessons from the Economic Literature
Two lessons for telecommunications policy makers emerge
from the economic literature discussed above. The first is that
there is no rule of thumb for how concentration will affect innova-
tion comparable to the presumption about how concentration will
affect prices and output levels. In a technologically dynamic in-
dustry like telecommunications, regulators cannot ignore claims
that innovation may go hand in hand with increased concentra-
tion. Nor, however, can regulators take such claims at face value.
The second lesson, which follows from the first, is that policy
makers must make a careful, case-by-case analysis before they
can accept a tradeoff between competition and innovation.
Such case-specific analysis can be difficult because the inno-
vation at issue will frequently be speculative, the need for the
market-concentrating transaction will be uncertain, and the ul-
timate costs and benefits will be difficult to ascertain and balance
in advance. Meanwhile, regulators will probably have an easier
time assessing whether increased concentration will raise prices
and reduce output levels in the relevant markets. The combina-
tion of speculative benefits and comparatively certain costs might
seem itself to determine that the presumption should be against
allowing concentration. But in industries like telecommunica-
tions, whose performance is arguably judged as much by the pace
of innovation as by price and output levels,46 the more conserva-
tive and better-lit path will not always be the one that maximizes
economic welfare over time. Given the ambiguity both of eco-
nomic theory and of the available empirical data on the relation-
ship between market structure and innovation, more industry-
specific analysis is necessary.
The next section of this Article takes a step in that direction.
It looks at the U.S. telecommunications industry and examines
how, in that particular context, market structure and deployment
of innovative technology have historically correlated.
III. DEPLOYMENT OF NEW TECHNOLOGY IN U.S.
TELECOMMUNICATIONS NETWORKS
This section discusses ten significant cases of technological
innovation in U.S. telecommunications networks and examines
how deployment rates for those innovations varied with market
46 See Figure 1 (showing how telecommunications patents have become an increasing
percentage of all patents granted in the US).
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structure. The markets at issue range from pure monopolies to
relatively competitive oligopoly structures. For example, touch-
tone dialing was implemented under monopoly conditions, while
digital wireless telephony took hold under competition among
several firms. For purposes of this section's analysis, market
structures are divided into three categories: monopoly, concen-
trated oligopoly (two or three firms), and competitive oligopoly
(more than three firms).
Of the ten technological cases examined, four involve innova-
tions deployed in monopoly markets, three address innovations
deployed under concentrated oligopoly, and three involve tech-
nologies deployed in comparatively competitive oligopoly mar-
kets. This section will first discuss the technological cases, begin-
ning with those involving monopolistic markets. The discussion of
each case will explain the technology at issue, describe the mar-
ket structure of the industry that deployed the technology, and
examine the rate at which the industry incorporated the technol-
ogy into its network. This section will then compare the cases to
determine how market structure and technological deployment
have correlated in the American telecommunications industry.
A. Technology Cases
1. Deployment under monopoly conditions.
The four sample technologies deployed in monopolistic mar-
kets were touch-tone dialing, digital stored-program-control
switching, ISDN transmission, and electronic stored-program-
control switching. The deployment times for those technologies,
defined as the time it took for each to be deployed in thirty per-
cent of the relevant network points," were respectively four,
47 The technologies examined differ in the parts of the network relevant to measuring
their adoption and implementation. For example, customer lines are a reasonable metric
for automatic switching, stored-program control, and touch-tone access because their
impact is felt directly by an individual customer. It is at the line level that bypassing a live
operator and faster dialing are noticed. Central offices (the facilities where switches are
located) are taken as the relevant network points for digital switching, SS-7 signaling, and
ISDN capability (although percentage of lines covered might also be a good measure of
ISDN deployment). Subscribers are the measure for coverage by digital wireless networks.
Percentage of total route miles is the measure for deployment of fiber-optic transport. And
finally, percentage of homes on the network that can receive DSL and cable-modem
transmission are used as the metric for deployment of those services. As a comparison
point across all technologies, this paper looks at the time it took for a particular technol-
ogy to be adopted in 30 percent of the relevant network points. That benchmark is arbi-
trary, but is designed to capture a point at which a technology has taken hold without
requiring that it have become dominant.
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seven, nine, and fourteen years. More detailed discussions of each
case follow.
a) Touch-tone dialing. AT&T introduced touch-tone dial-
ing, or dual tone multi-frequency ("DTMF") dialing, in 1963.48 The
Bell companies deployed touch-tone during a time when they had
a monopoly over both telephone services and, through AT&T's
Western Electric manufacturing division, the supply of the tech-
nology and equipment necessary to provide those services.
Touch-tone dialing reduced costs for both service providers
and customers by reducing the time and network resources
needed to complete a call. Turning the dial of a conventional ro-
tary telephone produces pulses that open and close circuits to the
central office, with the number of pulses representing the number
dialed. This method of transmitting a phone number requires the
caller to wait for the dial to reset itself after each digit. With
touch-tone dialing, buttons transmit varied tones that represent
different numbers. A single tone substitutes for a series of pulses,
so the ten digits that take a switch more than 11 seconds to proc-
ess when dialed from a rotary phone take only 1 second from a
touch tone phone.49 Touch-tone dialing, therefore, requires fewer
switching and transport resources and leads to more rapid call
completion.
Bell Labs developed DTMF in the late 1950s and conducted
technical trials from 1959 to 1961."° The Bells first deployed
touch-tone service commercially in 1963, and by 1976 approxi-
mately 70 percent of its lines could receive touch-tone service
(Figure 2).
b) Digital switching. Another technology that was imple-
mented under monopoly conditions was digital switching. Like
touch-tone dialing, digital switching could improve network effi-
ciency, although without the immediate consumer benefit of
touch-tone. By the 1970s, telecommunications providers were
converting long-distance transmission lines and lines connecting
central offices from analog transmission to digital signaling (to be
48 See See Amos E. Joel, Jr. and G. E. Schindler, Jr, eds, A History of Engineering and
Science in the Bell System: Switching Technology (1925-1975) 336-43 (Bell Telephone
Libraries 1982).
49 Annabel Z. Dodd, The Essential Guide to Telecommunications 110 (Prentice-Hall
1999).
50 Joel and Schindler, Switching Technology at 337 (cited in note 48).
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Figure 2: Touch Tone5'
Touch Tone Access Lines
RBOC Touch Tone Capable Unes as Percentage of Total Lines
1963 1964 1965 196 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976
Figure 3: Digital Switching 2
RBOC Digital Central Offices
1979 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1989 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993
51 Data for this case is number of lines served by touch-tone capable central offices
compared to the total number of telephone lines. Joel and Schindler, Switching Technol-
ogy at 343 (cited in note 48); AT&T Co Comptroller's Accounting Division, Bell System
Statistical Manual (1970-1981) 511 (1982).
52 Data for this case is the number of Bell system central offices that are digital stored
program control: FCC, 1999 Trends in Telephone Service, Table 18.1 (1999), available
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discussed, infra).53 When providers used conventional electronic
switches with digital lines, signals had to be converted between
digital and analog many times as the switch routed and con-
nected the signals over the network. For example, a call that
originated as an analog signal over the local loop had to be con-
verted by the central office switch to digital format for transport
over a high-capacity ("TI") line to a long distance office. At the
long distance office, the signal had to be re-converted to analog
format so the long distance switch could process it and then be
converted again to digital so the call could move across the long-
haul digital lines. From there, the process was repeated on the
termination side until the call reached the ultimate recipient.
Fully digital switches avoided the need for such conversions ex-
cept at the very ends of the network and thereby improved the
speed and efficiency of switching.
Independent telephone systems and the Bell system both im-
plemented digital switching around 1976. The Bell system first
used the No. 4 ESS digital switch for toll (generally long-distance)
calls in Chicago in early 1976.14 An independent system in Cali-
fornia, however, was the first to deploy digital switching systems
at the local level, also in early 1976."5 Deployment of digital
switching accelerated in the early 1980s and passed the 30 per-
cent level in 1984 (Figure 3).
c) ISDN transmission. A third technology implemented by
local exchange monopolies was ISDN transmission. ISDN is "a
digital, worldwide public standard for sending voice, video, data,
or packets over the public switched telephone network."56 ISDN
was initially seen as the next step in the evolution of the basic
voice telephone system. Carriers hoped it would allow users to
connect with others on the network and to exchange not just
voice, but data as well. It also provided a high-speed service op-
tion for customers who desired rapid data transmission in addi-
tion to standard telephone service but whose needs (or budgets)
online at <http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/CommonCarrier/Reports/FCC-StateLink/IAD/
trendl99.pdf> (visited Oct 11, 2000).
53 E.F. O'Neill, ed, A History of Engineering and Science in the Bell System: Trans-
mission Technology (1925-1975) 563 (AT&T Bell Laboratories 1985).
54 Robert J. Chapuis and Ames E. Joel, Jr., Electronics, Computers and Telephone
Switching 336 (North-Holland 1990).
55 Id at 340.
56 Id at 146.
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did not justify the expensive high-speed options (like T1 lines)
that until then had been the only options.
Basic ISDN gives users two communications "channels" over
one pair of wires, and each channel can be used either for voice or
for data.5" ISDN standards were developed throughout the 1980's
and finalized internationally in the early 1990s.5" Nortel was the
first firm to demonstrate a public network telephone call over
ISDN in 1987,"9 the same year the technology was first deployed
from a local Bell operating company central office."s Providing
ISDN requires an "SS-7" switch (see infra) and additional equip-
ment for receiving and processing ISDN calls at the local central
office. By 1997, ISDN was available from nearly 40 percent of
RBOC central offices, which translated into coverage for over 70
percent of all lines (Figure 4).
ISDN was deployed at a time when the local telephone mo-
nopolies were beginning to be challenged at the periphery. By the
early 1990s, for example, competitive access providers offered
bypass of the incumbent local networks for long-distance calls.
But little competing service for calls between local customers in a
region existed. 1 Indeed, by 1995, competitors to the incumbent
carriers still had well less than one percent of the local market by
revenues and put little competitive pressure on either the basic or
enhanced service offerings of the incumbent firms.2
d) Electronic stored-program-control. The fourth sample
technology that was implemented under monopoly conditions was
"electronic stored program control" switching. In the first auto-
matic-dial systems, each number dialed on a telephone moved
equipment in the switch to make a connection. By the time a cus-
tomer dialed a full sequence of numbers, the switch would have
established a path-a series of connections-to the number
57 ISDN comes in two modes: basic rate and primary rate. Basic rate ISDN provides
two 64 Kbps channels and one 16 Kbps channel for signaling or data, for a total speed of
144 Kbps. Primary rate ISDN provides 23 channels and a 16 Kbps signaling/data channel
for a total speed of 1.54 Mbps.
58 Dodd, Essential Guide to Telecommunications at 147 (cited in note 49).
59 Id.
60 Data is the number of RBOC central offices that offer ISDN: FCC, 1999. 1999
Trends in Telephone Service, Table 18.2 (cited in note 52).
61 See Howard A. Shelanski, A Comment on Competition and Controversy in Local
Telecommunications, 50 Hastings L J 1617, 1631 (1999).
62 Industry Analysis Division Common Carrier Bureau FCC, Local Competition Re-
port: August 1999, <http://www.fcc.gov/cdo/stats> (visited Sept 29, 2000).
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Figure 4: Central offices offering ISDN service63
ISDN Central Offices (RBOC)
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Figure 5: Electronic Stored Program Control64
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63 FCC, 1999 Trends in Telephone Service, table 18.2 (cited in note 52).
64 Case data represents the number of access lines served by electronic stored pro-
gram control central offices. Bell System Statistical Manual (1950-1981) at 511 (cited in
note 51). Katie C. Rangos, Infrastructure of the Local Operating Companies (Industry
Analysis Division, Common Carrier Bureau, FCC 1999), <http://www.fcc.gov/ccb/stats>
(visited Sept 18, 2000).
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dialed. A stored program control ("SPC")65 switch stores and proc-
esses an entire number sequence before instructing the switch
how to route the call. This routing method greatly expands the
capacity of central offices by using switches more efficiently.
In the early 1950s, Bell Labs and Western Electric Company
undertook a massive research effort to develop a stored program
control system.6 They devoted four thousand man-years of work
and more than $500 million over the course of a decade to put the
Electronic Switching System 1 ("ESS-1") into commercial opera-
tion, which they did starting in Succasunna, New Jersey on May
30, 1965.67 Stored program control systems were quickly put into
use throughout AT&T and, to a lesser extent, independent net-
works. By 1979, over 30 percent of central office switches used
electronic stored program control (Figure 5).
2. Deployment under concentrated oligopoly conditions.
Just as the data discussed above show deployment times for
new technologies to vary under monopoly conditions, the data
from this study's sample also shows the speed of implementation
to vary when a modest degree of competition exists in the rele-
vant market. Three sample innovations, fiber-optic transport, SS-
7 signaling, and automatic switching were deployed in markets
that were concentrated but not monopolistic-i.e. that had two or
three firms in competition. The times for deployment to reach 30
percent of the relevant network points varied from four years for
SS-7 signaling, to six years for fiber-optic transport, to twelve
years for automatic switching.
a) SS-7 signaling. A telephone system needs some form of
signaling to alert the switch and customer-end equipment that a
call is coming in, to route a call over the network, and to monitor
the status of a line (e.g. to see if it is busy). Until recently, sig-
naling information traveled over the same paths that carried
telephone conversations-so-called "in-band" signaling. To take
the most basic example, in the early days of telephony a caller
would contact a central office operator (by pushing a button or
turning a crank) and tell the operator whom she wanted to call.
65 A stored program control is "routing of a phone call through a switching matrix...
handled by a program stored in a computer like-device, which may well be a special-
purpose computer" Newton's Telecom Dictionary, 805 (Telecom Books 16th ed 2000).
66 See Chapuis and Joel, Electronics, Computers and Telephone Switching at 29-66
(cited in note 54).
67 Id at 40.
104 [2000:
851 ANTITRUST AND INNOVATION IN TELECOMMUNICATIONS 105
The operator would then pass the information down the line to
other operators in other central offices, establish a connection to
the called party's telephone, and then allow the caller's transmis-
sion to begin. The above steps were eventually automated, but
the underlying signals (communicating the "address" of the party
being called, telling the destination telephone to ring, etc.) were
still carried in much the same, sequential manner as before
automation.
In the 1970s, AT&T and Bell Labs developed a new signaling
system that was faster and more efficient. Instead of sending sig-
naling information ahead of a call over the voice path, the new
technology sent the information over a parallel and separate data
path that worked almost simultaneously with the call itself,
thereby speeding call routing and transmission." The new system
was called common channel interoffice signaling ("CCIS"). AT&T
developed CCIS into the more sophisticated and higher speed
Signaling System 7 standard, which the International Telecom-
munications Union ("ITU") approved in 1980.9 SS-7 was first im-
plemented at the toll (that is, long-distance) level in both AT&T's
and competitor's systems. Only in 1987 was it put into use in lo-
cal offices. By 1991, it was already available in approximately 30
percent of BOC central offices and deployment was well over 90
percent by 1997 (Figure 6).
b) Fiber-optic transport. Another improvement in telephone
transmission that took place at about the same time that the
shift to SS-7 signaling occurred was fiber-optic transport. Instead
of using copper wire to carry calls, fiber-optic technology uses
light to transport information through thin filaments of glass.
The underlying concept of transmitting voice or data over light is
an old one. Indeed, Alexander Graham Bell demonstrated "pho-
tophony," the transport of voice over a beam of light, in 1880.
Photophony had limited range and was subject to interference by
weather and objects. Engineers first experimented with transmit-
ting images over glass fibers in the 1930s.70 The technical limita-
tions were substantial, however. First, the light sources gener-
ated too much "noise;" even though an intelligible light signal
could be put onto the glass, the output was often incoherent.
68 Dodd, Essential Guide to Telecommunications at 126 (cited in note 49).
69 Id at 132.
70 Edward Lacy, Fiber Optics 14-15 (Prentice-Hall 1982).
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Figure 7: Fiber Optics 72
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71 RBOC SS-7 capable central offices as percentage of total: FCC, Trends in Telephone
Service, Table 18.2 (cited in note 52).
72 The data for this case is AT&T's fiber miles over total miles of wire. FCC, Statistics
of Common Carriers Table 14 (FCC 1986-1987), (FCC, 1988-1994); Statistics of Commu-
nication Common Carriers Table 210 (1986-1994).
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Second, the medium carrying the light signal had to be able to
carry the signal for long distances. Before 1970, the best-quality
glass or lens systems could only carry an intelligible light signal
100 meters.73 It took the development of lasers in 1958 at Bell
Laboratories74 and the development of "low-loss" optical fibers at
Coming Glass Works in the early 1970s 75 to make fiber optics a
viable commercial technology.76
Fiber optics dramatically cut the costs of transmitting infor-
mation. Two strands of fiber, each about the width of a hair, can
carry more information than a four-inch bundle of copper wires;
and it can do so with fewer errors, a longer lifetime, and less sus-
ceptibility to interference.77 The General Telephone Company of
California was the first to use fiber optical links in a commercial
telephone network, initiating service on April 22, 1977.78 Under
pressure from competitive entrants into the long-distance service
market, AT&T began seriously deploying fiber optics in its
transmission system in the mid-1980s, reaching 75 percent of
total miles of wire by 1994 (Figure 7).
In 1977, when General Telephone first demonstrated fiber
optics in the telephone network, AT&T had nearly a complete
monopoly over long-distance telephone service. But changes in
the structure of the long-distance market had nonetheless been
set in motion. In 1959, the FCC began allowing the private use of
microwave facilities for transmission of long-distance voice or
data traffic.79 This put limited competitive pressure on AT&T, as
large companies could move some of their long-distance traffic to
their own networks if AT&T's prices were too high. Over the
years that followed, the courts and the FCC proceeded gradually
to open the commercial long-distance market to competition. This
process concluded when the equal access provisions of the 1984
divestiture bolstered the FCC's 1980 decision to allow open com-
petition.8" By 1989, when AT&T had deployed fiber optics
throughout 30 percent of its network, new entrants deploying
73 O'Neill, Transmission Technology at 660 (cited in note 53).
74 Id at 657.
75 Id at 658.
76 Lacy, Fiber Optics at 15 (cited in note 70).
77 Dodd, Essential Guide to Telecommunications at 49-51 (cited in note 49).
78 Lacy, Fiber Optics at 11 (cited in note 70).
79 Allocation of Frequencies in the Bands Above 890M, 27 FCC 359 (1959).
80 United States v American Telephone & Telegraph Co, 552 F Supp 131, 195 and
Appendix B (D DC 1984).
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fiber technology had taken nearly 35 percent of the long-distance
market.8'
c) Automatic switching. The third sample technology de-
ployed in highly concentrated, but not monopoly, markets was
automatic switching. Early telephone systems required an opera-
tor in a central office to connect users manually. Old movie scenes
in which efficient operators answer a line, take the caller's re-
quest, and then route the line manually through a port in the
switchboard give a stylized picture of what was involved. Auto-
matic switching" eliminated the caller's interaction with the live
operator83 by allowing customers to dial numbers themselves and
by using electromechanical, rather than manual, switches to
make connections automatically.
The A.B. Strowger Company developed the first automatic
switching systems more than a century ago, motivated in part by
Almon Strowger's concern for privacy-he thought the operators
were listening in on his calls.84 The first, primitive automatic ex-
change for public service went into operation in 1892 in a small,
independent telephone company office in La Porte, Illinois.85
Telephone companies refined the technology and automatic
switching came into its modern form in 1907.86 By then it was
possible for one piece of switching equipment to route large num-
bers of calls, creating scale efficiencies.
Telecommunications providers deployed automatic switching
systems over three decades during which local telecommunica-
tions markets went from monopoly to limited competition and
back again. When the original Bell patents for telephone service
expired in 1893-1894, about 60 independent companies were of-
fering service.87 By 1907, with the onset of automatic switches,
there were more than 5,000 independent carriers, and they oper-
81 See FCC Long-Distance Report, 1999 FCC Lexis 1351, *7 (table showing AT&T's
share of interstate minutes in 1988-89).
82 An automatic exchange is [a] term for a central office which automatically and
electronically switches calls between subscribers without using an operator." Newton's
Telecom Dictionary at 83 (cited in note 65).
83 In this case, automation refers only to automating local calls. See Joel and Schin-
dler, Switching Technology at 7 (cited in note 48).
84 Dodd, Essential Quide to Telecommunications at 30 (cited in note 49).
85 Robert J. Chapuis, 100 Years of Telephone Switching (1878-1978) Part 1: Manual
and Electromechanical Switching (1878-1960s) 61 (North-Holland 1982).
86 Id at 67. Group selection, dial-pulsing, the line-finder, and central battery power
supply were not all used in systems until 1907.
87 M.D. Fagen, ed, A History of Engineering and Science in the Bell System: The Early
Years (1875-1925) 551 (Bell Telephone Laboratories 1975).
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ated about 45 percent of the nation's telephone lines.8 At first,
the new entrants focused on markets the Bell system had ig-
nored-smaller towns and rural areas. Figures are not available
on the extent of actual head-to-head competition, but at least in
some large cities, consumers could choose between two or perhaps
even more local providers.89 Shortly after losing its original pat-
ent-based dominance, however, the Bell System began re-
acquiring its lost market share by refusing to interconnect inde-
pendents to its local networks or to its superior long-distance
network. Bell soon began acquiring independents and swapping
service areas so that there was only one provider in any given
area." By the time automatic switching reached 30 percent of the
market, the Bell System served 80 percent of all lines9' and there
was virtually no head-to-head competition (Figure 8).
Figure 8: Automatic Switching
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On the technology-production side, AT&T's subsidiary, West-
ern Electric, manufactured almost all customer-end and central
office equipment used in the Bell system, from handsets to
88 Id.
89 See generally Robert Noll and Bruce Owen, Anticompetitive Uses of Regulation, in
John E. Kwoka, Jr. and Lawrence J. White, eds, The Antitrust Revolution, (Scott, Fores-
man 1989).
90 Gerald W. Brock, The Telecommunications Industry: The Dynamics of Market
Structure 65 (Harvard 1981).
91 Noll & Owen, Anticompetitive Uses of Regulation (cited in note 89).
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switches. 2 In 1916, Western Electric acquired the manufacturing
rights for automatic-switching equipment.93 Early on, the Auto-
matic Electric Company made equipment to Bell system specifi-
cations and, beginning in 1926, Western Electric began manufac-
turing this equipment as well.94 Throughout this time, other
manufacturers, such as the North Electric Company, were also
producing automatic switching systems, though they enjoyed only
limited success (Western Electric also purchased manufacturing
rights to the North Electric system in 1916.)"5 The technology-
production side of the market was thus not as concentrated as it
was for some of the other innovations discussed in this study but
was nonetheless not highly competitive.
3. Deployment under competitive oligopoly conditions.
Although none of the innovations in this study's sample were
deployed in a market that contained a large number of competing
firms, three of the cases involve markets that had more than
three competitors. Those technology cases are digital subscriber
line telephone transmission, cable modem service, and digital
wireless transmission. As with the technologies implemented un-
der monopoly and concentrated oligopoly conditions, those im-
plemented under comparatively competitive oligopoly conditions
vary in their deployment times. In this sample, the time it took
for the innovation to be deployed in 30 percent of the relevant
network points ranged from two years for DSL capability, to
three years for cable modem service, to seven years for wireless
digitization.
a) Digital Subscriber Line service. DSL technology" uses
sophisticated compression techniques to increase the data carry-
ing capacity of existing copper wires. By placing a modem at the
carrier's central office and another at the customer's premises,
DSL provides customers an "always-on" connection to the inter-
92 AT&T/Bell did operate equipment from Automatic Electric in systems it had ac-
quired from Independents. By 1915, Bell operated Automatic Electric equipment served




96 DSL technology "uses existing copper wires from the telephone company central
office to the subscriber's premises, involves electronic equipment in the form of ADSL
modems at both the central office and the subscriber's premises, sends high-speed digital
signals up and down those copper wires." Newton's Telecom Dictionary at 41 (cited in note
65).
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net at speeds of up to 8 megabytes-per-second ("Mbps")-far
faster than the maximum 56 kilobytes-per-second ("Kbps")
achievable over the same lines with conventional modems. Bell-
core, now Telcordia, developed DSL in 1989 as a way to deliver
video signals to users from central offices over telephone lines. 7
Although telephone companies did not initially use DSL technol-
ogy for video or any other consumer offering, they did use DSL for
internal purposes and to improve the operation of their networks.
For example, certain DSL technologies eliminated a substantial
amount of the work ("cleaning" lines to customers and installing
repeaters to maintain transmission speed) necessary to provide
high-speed "TI" data service to business customers. The local Bell
companies thus used DSL as an input for the provision of faster
and more expensive data services.
Carriers did not offer DSL service as a consumer product on
its own until late in 1996. That year, the Telecommunications Act
of 1996 ("the Act") opened the local telephone market to competi-
tion. The Act required incumbent telephone companies to lease
out elements of their systems for competitors to use to provide
service.9 New entrants were then able to lease copper "loops"
that link central offices to customers, install their own DSL
equipment and connections to the internet, and offer high-speed
data service to customers that was cheaper and easier to obtain
than T1 service.
An internet service provider and an incumbent local tele-
phone carrier in Alaska were the first to offer DSL to consumers,
towards the end of 1996.00 Since then, numerous competing car-
riers have entered the market for high-speed data services by of-
fering DSL to business and residential customers. Incumbent
carriers began wide-scale commercial deployment of DSL in
1998.01
97 Dodd, Essential Guide to Telecommunications at 152 (cited in note 49).
98 Carl Liebold, Telcos Look to Enter Homes via DSL, Electronic Engineering Times,
(Mar 4, 1996).
99 47 USC § 251(c)(3) (2000).
100 David Kopf, Striking While the Copper is HOT, America's Network 8 (Nov 15, 1996)
<http://www.americasnetwork.comlissues/96issues/961115/111596-adslpro.html> (visited
Sept 19, 2000); ADSL Forum, 1998. ADSL Service Deployments, <http://www.adsl.com/
servicematrix.html> (visited Aug 1999).
101 Analyst reports and Telechoice, Deployment Update, <http://www.xdsl.com/content/
resources/deployment info.asp> (visited Nov 9, 1999) (Data is the proportion of RBOC
lines that could be served by xDSL).
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DSL faces a variety of technical hurdles, including limits re-
lated to the length and physical condition of customer lines. °2
The DSL market nonetheless became hotly contested early on,
with numerous entrants as well as providers of alternative tech-
nologies like cable modem service (see below) competing for
broadband customers. It took only three years from the first
commercial deployment of DSL for the technology to reach 30
percent of telephone company central offices.' Although the ac-
tual number of lines served is only a tiny fraction of the total
served by any central office, the number of subscribers is growing
rapidly and the capability is in place for carriers to serve the ris-
ing demand.
b) Cable modem service. Cable modem"0 4 service provides
consumers with high-speed data access through the cable televi-
sion system. The service thus competes to a large degree, though
over a distinct physical network, with DSL service. To offer cable
modem capability, cable operators must first enable their net-
works to provide sufficient two-way capability for customers to
send as well as receive data. Operators must in addition install
equipment at the cable office (the cable "head end") that can re-
ceive data from subscribers as well as transmit data and pro-
gramming to them. Furthermore, these upgraded systems must
be supported and connected to content by building an IP net-
working infrastructure that interconnects with the internet back-
bone.' 5 With these changes, conventional cable systems can pro-
vide high-speed internet access over one or more of their chan-
nels. Cable modems were first tested around the country at the
end of 1993,10' but were not offered commercially until 1995."7
102 See In the Matter of Inquiry Concerning the Deployment of Advanced Telecommuni-
cations Capability to All Americans in a Reasonable And Timely Fashion, 2000 FCC Lexis
4411, *287; Howard A. Shelanski, The Speed Gap: Broadband Infrastructure and Elec-
tronic Commerce, 14 Berkeley Tech L J 721, 727 (1999).
103 In 1999 there were 22,154 total central offices, and by the end of 1999, private data
sources reported that carriers have deployed DSL in 6,897 of those offices. See FCC, 1999.
Trends in Telephone Service, CCB/IAD, Table 6.1 (depicting the number of central offices)
(cited in note 52); Q4 1999 TeleChoice DSL Deployment Summary, <http://www.xdsl.con
content/resources/deployment-info.asp> (visited Oct 5, 2000) (depicting the rate of DSL
deployment).
104 "[A] cable modem is a modem designed for use on a TV coaxial cable circuit." New-
ton's Telecom Dictionary at 134 (cited in note 65).
105 This includes backbone connectivity to the internet, and the routers, servers, and
network management tools to enable communications'across the network.
106 Jones Intercable was the first cable company to start testing when it offered, on a
limited basis, service to Alexandria, Virginia in December 1993. See Kent Gibbons, Cable
TV to Carry Internet to Alexandrians, Washington Times B9 (Sept 30, 1993). Several other
[2000:
85] ANTITRUSTAND INNOVATION IN TELECOMMUNICATIONS 113
Since then, cable operators have been rapidly upgrading their
systems to support high-capacity, two-way transmissions; over 30
percent of cable homes were offered cable modem service by
1999.1°8
c) Digital wireless transmission. The first wireless tele-
phone systems built in the United States used analog transmis-
sion technology. In the early 1990s, some wireless operators be-
gan instead to use digital transmission of conversations (as a se-
ries of on and off pulses) as opposed to analog signals. The con-
version to digital technology enabled wireless providers to carry
vastly more traffic than they could over analog systems with the
same amount of spectrum. Depending on the technology used,
digital cellular offers three to ten times the capacity of analog
service over the same bandwidth. 109 It also enables calls of higher
sound quality, and other new services such as caller id, paging,
and messaging. The conversion of analog systems to digital
started in Chicago and Los Angeles in 1992-93."'
When the FCC initially distributed cellular licenses in 1984,
one license for each market was given to the incumbent local
telephone company and the other was allocated through a lottery
to a competitor. In 1992, the FCC published a rollout plan for al-
locating additional spectrum for a new set of digital wireless tele-
phone services called Personal Communications Services ("PCS")
which would compete with existing cellular services."' Congress
mandated that the FCC auction licenses for the new spectrum
starting in 1994.12 Competition increased quickly after the auc-
tions. In the last quarter of 1999, nearly all Americans (94 per-
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75 percent had a choice of five or more carriers.11 There are now,
on average, more than two PCS providers competing against the
two original cellular licensees in each geographical market. By
1998, about 30 percent of wireless subscribers in the United
States were on digital systems (Figure 9)."1 The wireless sector
was thus quite competitive during the early deployment period
for digital wireless service. The market for the network equip-
ment necessary to provide digital wireless service has also been
comparatively competitive, with producers such as Nokia, Lucent,
Ericsson, and Motorola vying for share.
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B. Analysis of the Data on Deployment and Market Structure
The above case studies reveal that there have historically
been greatly varying deployment rates for important, innovative
telecommunications technologies. The comparisons are certainly
imperfect. The sample technologies differ in their costs of de-
ployment, the parts of the network relevant to measuring their
adoption and implementation, the benefits they confer on tele-
communications carriers and customers, how they are affected by
113 See William E. Kennard, Telecommunications @ the Millennium; The Telecom Act
at Four (Feb 8, 2000), 2000 WL 140542.
114 Annual Report and Analysis of Competitive Market Conditions With Respect to
Commercial Mobile Services: Fourth Report, Appendix B, Table 5, FCC Rec 10145 (1999).
115 Data is the number of digital cellular subscribers over total subscribers for cellular
license holders. Id.
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regulation, and other variables. Those factors should all be taken
into account in a complete analysis of telecommunications market
structure and innovation. But for the purposes of this paper--de-
veloping a preliminary presumption for policymakers about the
relationship between competition and innovation in U.S. tele-
communications markets-the comparisons provide a useful
benchmark, particularly in light of the systematic correlation in
the data, discussed in more detail below.
The time for the sample of technologies discussed above to
reach a 30 percent deployment level ranged from two years for
DSL to fourteen years for electronic stored-program-control
switching. The market structures in which the firms deploying
the technologies operated range from pure monopoly in the cases
of touch tone, digital switching, and ISDN; to duopoly or triopoly
for SS-7 signaling, fiber optics, and automatic switching; to com-
petition among several firms in the cases of digital wireless, DSL,
and cable modem service.
When deployment times and market structures are matched,
faster deployment times correlate with more competitive mar-
kets. Figure 10 plots deployment times against market structure,
taking into account the market structures for both the technol-
ogy-producing firms and the technology-deploying firms. While
there is substantial variation in deployment times for different
technologies under a given market structure-from four to four-
teen years under monopoly, four to twelve years under du-
opoly/triopoly, and two to seven years under competition-aver-
age deployment times speed up as markets become more competi-
tive.
The correlation presented below is, of course, a rough meas-
ure. A more useful analysis might compare how deployment rates
for a given technology change as market structures change. That
counterfactual exercise is difficult to perform, however, because
in most cases market structure did not vary for a given technol-
ogy during the relevant period. A couple of cases do, nonetheless,
provide insight into the effects of competition on the speed of de-
ployment.
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Figure 10: Average Time (Years) from
1st Adoption to 30% Penetration
Market Structure of Firms Deploying Innovation
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In the case of DSL, the technology was not deployed at all to
provide retail, high-speed data services when local exchange
companies had regional monopolies. Part of the reason DSL was
not offered may be that there was little demand for DSL before
mass use of the internet began in the early to mid 1990s. But the
implementation of ISDN, and the fact that DSL stayed off the
market even after internet use began to soar, suggests that other,
strategic considerations may have played a role in the incum-
bents' roll-out decisions. Indeed, only after Congress passed the
1996 Act and competition for data customers ensued did incum-
bents initiate commercial DSL offerings.
The second example, fiber optic technology, was available
and proven in a commercial telephone network in 1977. But only
in the mid-1980s, after the opening of the long-distance market to
competition and Sprint began touting its fiber-optic facilities, did
deployment accelerate. Again, the decision not to use fiber might
at first have been perfectly efficient; if the condition of existing
plant and demand conditions did not warrant rapid replacement
of long-distance infrastructure, rapid fiber deployment should not
have been expected. But as competition drove prices down, in-
creased call volume, and raised quality standards, carriers per-
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ceived fiber as a competitive necessity. In other cases examined
in this study, unfortunately, similar comparisons of deployment
of a given technology under varying market conditions are not
possible.
Another limitation of the simple correlation between market
structure and technological change is that it does not provide in-
formation about causality. There is no way to tell, without sub-
stantial additional analysis, whether market structure was sig-
nificant in speeding deployment or whether other variables-re-
turn on investment or regulatory factors, for example-are re-
sponsible for the variation in the sample. But the purpose of this
study is not to provide a full explanation for the rate of techno-
logical change in the industry. The goal is the much more modest
one of examining whether market competition has, on its face,
been either consistent or in tension with rapid deployment of new
telecommunications technology. What the positive correlation
between deployment and competitiveness tells policymakers is
that innovations in U.S. telecommunications have, across a var-
ied sample of technologies, implemented more quickly in competi-
tive than in non-competitive markets. Moreover, while there are
cases, such as touch-tone dialing, where deployment has occurred
quickly under monopoly, there is no case in which competition
appears to have slowed deployment. Again, that conclusion can-
not be definitively reached from the data in this study, but the
data do provide sufficient support for an initial presumption that
competition and implementation of new technology are mutually
reinforcing, rather than conflicting, objectives.
CONCLUSION
Regulation and antitrust enforcement in technologically dy-
namic markets are challenging tasks. Enforcement that impedes
technological change may have substantial social costs over time.
But enforcement that is overly diffident might yield concentrated
markets, higher prices, and no offsetting, long-term benefits. How
policy officials should approach conflicting claims about competi-
tion and innovation is one of the central questions in U.S. micro-
economic policy today. In many cases, there will not be any ten-
sion between these two objectives. In some, less frequent, cases,
tradeoffs between competition and technological change will exist
and the error costs of enforcement will be potentially large. This
article addresses how regulators and enforcement agencies
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should approach claims that such tradeoffs exist in the U.S. tele-
communications industry.
This Article concludes from its examination of historical case
studies of technological deployment that telecommunications
regulators and policymakers in the United States should ap-
proach claims that new products and services will flow from mar-
ket consolidation warily. They must certainly recognize that
technological innovation and conventional competitive ideals
might at times conflict in as dynamic an industry as telecommu-
nications. But their presumption should be in favor of preserving
competition, and the burden of persuasion should rest with those
arguing otherwise.
